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EASEM NTS - WITH EQUITABLE REIDIES .
The principl that 11 Equity will only inter-
fere where the remedy at law is inadequate, or utterly fails"
forms the basis of the following discussion.
I shall endeavor to make a brief outline of the general
subject of casements, including in this cursory survey, some
of the definCons adopted by modern text-writers , and laid
down in the written opinions of different judges, and also tn
discuss the essential elements of an casement, its divisions
into classes, some of its several qualities, the mdes of an-
quisition , and finally with the remedies which equity givp-
to those whose peaceful enjoyment of such easements are dis-
turbed and the law gives no relief.
Perhaps one cf the best definitions is the following:-
An easer.ent may be defined to be privilege ,without profit,
which the owner of one neighboring tenement hath of another
( existing in respect to their several tenements ) by which
-2-
the servient owner is obliged to suffer or not do something
on his own land, for the advantage of the dominant owner."
The above definition is taken from Gale on Easements, and is
quoted apprivingly by many judges.
Broome and Hadley, in their Commentaries say: " 1when the
owner of one tenement called the dominant tenement hathe
right to compel the owner of another called the servient ten-
ement, to permit to be done ot refrain from doing something
which as the owner of his tenement he would otherwise have
been entitled to restrain or to do respectively , such a
right is called an easement."
An easement, then , is one of the forms of interest in
real property distinguished from actual ownership.
Essential Elements .
There seems to be several essential elements which every
such right must haVe, and nearly all modern text-writers
agree on the following requisites:
First. That easements themselves are incorporeaL.
Second. That thoy are imposed on corporeal property, and
-3-
not upon the owners thereof personally.
Third. They confer ( as a rule ) no right to a participa-
tion in the profits arising from such use.
Fourth. They axe imposed for the benefit of corporeal prop-
erty.
Fifth. There must be two tenements, the dominant, to which
the right belongs, and the servient upon which the obligation
rests.
It would seem that nearly all modern writers exclude the
taking of profits and one eminent writer has 2aid"that rights
of accoimmodation in another's land as distinguished from
those that are directly profitable, are propesly called ease-
ments."
Natural Rights and Licenses
The right of control which we denominate easements, has
been by many writers and courts loosely confounded with cer-
tain rights which are natural, and others which are mere li-
censes.
First. Natural rights are those which are conferred on
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every land owner by law, and without which the land might be
rendered useless by the act of a neighbor, which would other-
wise be lawful. Among the natural rights says Goddard, is
the " due enjoyment of air, light, and water, which by pro-
vision of nature flows over the soil of one land owner to
thai of another for the common benefit of each".
Easements properly speaking, must be distinguished from
mere " licenses" . If it be attemptod to pass an easement
by parol, it transfers a mere license, as every casement must
( with exceptions hereinafter noted) be transferred by writing.
A license passes no vested interest nut simply makes an action
lawful which withoutwould be unlawful . One tenant in
common may grant a license to a third person to enter upon
the land and cut timber but he cannot confer an easement be-
cause he is not sole owner of the land. A license may be
revoked at any time Uefore the expenditure of money is made
upon it. 5 Watts, 308.
Having distinguished natural rights and licenses from
easements , there is now to be considered some of the class-
ifications and qualities.
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Some authors divide the subject into easements appurte-
nant, and in gross, but Goddard is probably right in saying
that technically there is no such thing as an easement in
gross, though this term is Iery conmonly used. A right in
gross is necessarily separated from the land, while an ease-'enl
cannot be but must be in respect to the tenement for and to
which it is granted.
There must also be a dominant and a servient tenement.
These tenements must be held by distinct and separate persons,
and the easement granted must be beneficial to the dominant
tenement and not reciprocally beneficial. By the best
authoritics it seems that, it is not necessary the. the owner
of the servient tenement must do anything for the benefit
of the dominant , but that he must suffer something to be done
inrespect to his lands,
Again easement is best distinguished from custom in that
an easement is a right that a single owner hath of another
while custom is the usage of a class. Custom ought there-
fore not to be confounded with easements.
Finally the law will not recognize new species of ease-
ments, in the absence of express agreement. " A new species
of incorporeal heriditaments cannot be created at the will
and pleasure of an individual owner of an estate.t lie must
be contented to take the sort of an esti e and the right to
dispose of it as he finds the law settled by decisions or
controlled by acts of parliament or by legislat= _ 4I
Inconsistent easements cannot co-exist except as one is
subordinate to another. There are certain classes of eae-
ments which are necessary to the enjoyment of property, and
,.hich would not be granted under any other circumstances.
If a man buys a piece of property entirely surronded by
land which does not belongr to him, it is necessary to the full
enjoyment to that which he does own, thi he should be at
liberty to pass over the ground of tha other. The courts
differ somewhat as to what degree of necessity shall govern
in such cacos. Earlier courts held tha nothing but abso-
lutely necessary easements shall be allowed in such cases,
but later courts hold that such rights ought to be granted as
makes the enjoyment of the property most convenient.
It would now be well to refer briefly to the most import-
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ant modes of acquisition.
Generally speaking, easements are acquired by act of man,
and by grant. Natural rights on the contrary, are those in-
herent in land. It is true that easements often arise by
prescription, but this originated in the presumption of a
lost deed or grant. Easements being incorporeal heridita-
ments, they can only be -ranted by deed. The -rant may be
either express or implied.
In order to be able to grant an casenent the grantor
must be the owner in fee, otherwise he could grant only a
liuense, as if he were tenant for years he could only grant
a right for his tenancy. He must be the Lole owner of the
fee. Ease
Easements may be acquired by express grant , either by
particular description or u~idr the general words of a deed of
conveyance. If the owner of land is possessed of an case-
ment in another's land he may on conveying his own land con-
vey also the easement by parti .ularly describing it. Again
if he conveys a part of his own land he may by a -,articular
description grant an emsement in the remaining part.
There has boen rach dispute and rsny delicate questions
have arisen as to what will )ass under agrant by general words
Goddard says, that "All casemcnts, properly so called, to
which a land owner has a right in the soil of a third -erson
wil -7ass to the grantee of the land under the general wotds
of conveyance ' together with all the esaements and appurte-
nances' and even if the word 'easements' is omitted the word
'appurtenances' is sufficient to carry those rights." Vhalley
v. Thompson, 1 B.& P., 371; Morris v. Edgington, 3 Taunt.,24;
Skull v. Genister, 16 C.B.,(N.S. ) 92;.
Easements of necessity will probably pass to the grantee
without any general words of this kind, and they will cer-
tainly pass under the general word" appurtenances".
The reOv't of the authorities as to grants by general
words is as follows:-
If a man bc a:. wner of two estates, and exercising the
quasi-easement over the one for the benefit of the other, the
words " with the appurtenances" will not pass the eaeoient to
the grantee. Hiownver, if the quasi-easement existed as an
casement before the union of the two estates, the words "with
-9-
the easements used and enjoyed therewith" will pass the ease-
ment. In all these cases mich will depend on the sur-
rounding citcumstances and the words used in the deed 'f
conveyance. It is not necessary to use the word " grant"
but any words which express the same mcaning will do.
In many cases grants are implied, and easements so grant-
ed are worthy of much discussion.
It is a general rule that the law will imply such ease-
ments as are necessary to the enjoyment of the estate. The
courts differ only upon the point as to whaL is necessary.
As said above , the earlier cases were inclined to restrict
to absolute necessity, b-t later decisions imply nearly every-
thing that is necessary to the convenience of the grantee.
In earlier times the most common of imtlied grants was
the presumption of a lost grant after a use of twenty years,
so if a person clairing title could snow a user for twenty
years , the courts would presume that he had a grant but had
lost it. This was a mere fiction of law,. After the Pro-
scription Act, this mode of implying a grant fell into disuse.
The subject of implied -rant will betreated more fully
-10-
under--
Acquisition by Pr( scription.
In botl England and America easements may be acquired by
act of stvtute aid this is often the case in railroads and
other corporations.
They also pass by devise, but these last mentioned modes
of acquisition are of little importance and will not be dis-
cussed farthe' than to say they exist.
The Acquisition of Easements by Prescription is probably
the most ordinary manner of obtaining an easement.
Were it possible, it would be interesting to discuss in
detail the history of prescription at common law, and after
the Prescription Act was passed in 1832. it will be im-
possible however to touch upon anything more than the essenti-
al elements of prescription .
Prescriptionthan at common law, was a mode of acquiring
real estate when no other title could be shown but that the
holder and those under whom he claimed had enjoyed its use
uninterruptedly since time irremorial. This in eerly com-
mon law extended to the reign of Richard I.. So as an
-ll-
easement must be conferred actually by grant , if it could
be shown that the claimant and his ancestors had enjoyed the
easement since the reign of Richard I., the law would presume
a grant.
In England the conmon law was radically modified by the
Prescription Act, passed in 18Z2, but in America its princi-
ples are still largely followed, the statutes being limited
to provisiom as to the length of time necessary to claim by
prescription.
The law o, most value and interest, to an American stud-
ent, is of course, the law of his own country, and in dis-
cussing this topic, the characteristics of our 6wn law will
be set forth with some attention to the English Prescription
Act. --I=
In this country not only is a certain number of' years
necessary ( twenty years In rost of the states) but the en-
joyment must be advers, continuous, open, and poacable , and
under a claim of right. It must be adverse an. not by per-
mtssion, that is it must be under a claim of right or under
such circymstances as to warrant a jury in inferring that it
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was made under a claim of right. The doctrine of prescript-
ion is most admirably surucd up in Ir.Chase's edition of
Blackstone. " The statutes of different states differ con-
siderably in detail, but the loading pLinciPles upon the sub-
ject are as follows: the possession of the person claiming
to have acquired title must have been actual, continucus,visi-
ble, notorious, distinct and hostile, under an adverse claim
of right. There must be a dispossession of the previous
owner or an occupation in exclusion of his right of possess-
ion.'
If the property be suitable for residence purposes, or
capable of improvement, actual occupation, or continued cul-
tivation, or inclosure, are usually re uisite as necessary
to establish a title by limitation. Possession is said to
be adverse when it is under a claim of interest or title
as against the owner and not in subordination to his title, or
by his permission. The usual period of limitation is twVenty
years as in case of prescription. The Prescription Act in
England has modified the common law in mans points, the doc-
trine as above stated is the one that generally exists in
-13-
America today. The states differ materially only as to the
length of time required.
It has been the object of this paper to give a more out-
line of 'he general sojoct of easements, more in otder to
form a basis for the following discussion of equitable reme-
dies, than to enter into a detail.
It now pur-oses to deal with the main question under
what circumstances will equity aid the injured party in the
enjoynent of his right.
The instrument or too,which equity works, is the injunct
ion. The tendancy of the earlier Chancery courts was to
leave the injured party to his remedy at law, hut of late
years the Courts of Chancery have been granted the/power to
award damages, and the applications to this Coutt are becoming
constantly more numerous.
It is a very general rule that Courts of Equity will
interfere by an injunction, only where the right of the party
complaining is clearly established , and the injury which he
must necessarily sustain if the work be allowed to proceed
is of such a nature that no adequate compensation can be
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afforded by damages only, and when delay itself would be a
wrong. 11 The leading principlcl' said Lord Bougham in Black-
emore v. Glanmoro-anshire, " in which I proceed in dealing with
the application of the p inciple which I humbly conceive ought
,generally speaking, to be the guide of the court, and to
limit i- s discretion in granting injunctions, at least where
no special circurstancos occur, is that such a restraint shall
be imposed as may suffice to stop the mischief complained of ,
and whore it is to stay an injury, to keep them as they are
for the present."
If the nusiance complined ';f be in its nature useful and
necessary to the public , though productive of inconvenience
to individuals, as a small-pox hospital, the court will not
interfere by injunction, so to, where the injury is of a tem-
porary nature only.
In England the Judicature Act as merged the common law
and equity courts so that it is very ,eneral to ask for an




Equitable easements are so called because chiefly within
the cognizance of courts of equity. These case- are cn-
stantly increasina in number, and deserve therefore close and
careful attention.
At this point it will be well to consider some of the
most prominent of t:lese cases, and one of the most important
and conmonly cited is that of Phrkor v. Nightengale, 6 Allen,
341.
In this case the f'acts were as follows:- The estates in
litigation were situated in Boston and upon a cul de sac or
a street opened only at one end,. Upon each side of this
street, houses had been erected. The land in question orig-
inally belonged to several heirs vwho agreed between themselves
that the land should be laid out in a court as above mentioned
and that each of the said heirs should put a clause in every
d eed of conveyance, made out, tha the land should be used
for dwelling houses only , and the buildings should be of
stone or brick, and at least three stories high. Deeds were
made out according to the agreement, and this clause,in
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question, was repeated in all subsequent conveyances
The cause of this suit was the action of one of the
tenants who proposed to open a restaurant in one of the
houses built under the above arrangement. The owners of the
other hous s on the cul de sac .raying an injunction to re-
strain him from so doing. None of the present owners of the
property being the original heirs , there was obviously no
privity of contract or estate between them. The privity : as
clearly between the origina1 grantors and the present grantees
and the question which presented itself for decision ( and a
very important principle it was ) was the -rivity ietween the
original grantors and the present grantees of such a nature
as to constitute an obligation on any one of the present
grantees to observe the negative easement of the co-grantees
not to open a restauarnt. It was hold that it was, and the
opinion of the court was so forcible and clear, tha it is
best to quote a portion of it. "1 A covenant though in gross
at law, may nevertheless be binding in equity even to the
extent of fastening an easement on real property, or of scour-
ing to the owner of one parcol of land a privilege or as it
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is sometimes called 'a right to an ameniity' in the use of an
adjoining parcel, by which his own estate may be enhanced in
value and rendered more agreeable as a place of residence. "
" So long as he " ( the original purchaser) " retains
the title in himself his covenants and agreeents respecting
the use and enjoyment v-ili be binding upon himself personally
and can be qnforeed in equity." " A purchaser of land with
notice of a right or interest, in it existing only 1y agree-
ment with his vendor, is bound to do that which his grantor
had agreed to perform, because it would be unconscientious
and inequitable for him to violate or disregard the valid
agreement of his vendor in regard to the estvt e , of which he
had notice whe:. he became purchaser. in such cases it is
true thot the aggrieved party can often have no remedy at law.
There may be neither privity of estate nor privity of con-
tract between himself and those who attempt to appropriate
property in controvention of the use and mode of enjoyment
impressed upon it by the cgreement oftheir grrantor, and with
notice of which they took. the estate from him."
He further argues that by the original agreement which
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was embodied in all subsequent conv :yanccs , each subsequent
owner had a right or casement in the property of each other
owner, and that though this might not be enforceable at law,
it would certainly have its remedy in equity and would there-
fore come under the classification of equitable casements.
In the subsequent case of Hubbcll v. Warren, 8 All'n,17g.
the court after reaffirmins the doctrine laid down in Parker
v. Nightengale, onu ciated a further principle, namely, thc
to establish an easement over %w.hich equity will take cogni-
zance, it must be shown by express terms or by necessary and
unavoidable implication that the easement was intended to be
permanent, and not simply for the lives of the present owners.
In the last case cited, Hubbell v. Warren, 8 Allen, 173, the
defendant granted c-le of the seve al house lots upon a certain
square and stipulated in the deed of convoyancc that houseo
should not be erected within ten feet from the line of 'he
street. The plaintiff brought a bill in equity to restrain
the defendant from building within twelve feet from the line
of thestreet declaring that this was a ;arol a-reement and
the plaintiff haf aotbd upon it.
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The Court hold here that though such an agreement in
writing as alove, might net be T' inding at law for want of
privity of estate between the grantees, of the original part-
ies, still a parol agreement might be enforced in equity to
create an easement. The Cnurt laid down the following
rule to govern such cases.
It must appear by r-xpress stipulaticn or py necessary and
unavoidable implication that the parties intended to impose
a permanent restraint on the use or mode of occupation of
their respective estates.
This may be done by writing, but where it rests in parol
there must be such a stipulation shown as to indicate clearly
the intention of the parties. The question then turned
on the nature of the agreement as tothe two feet difference
In the case of Brewer v. Marshall, 4 C.E.Green, 5:Z, the
facts were similar to those in Parker v. Nightengale, several
adjacent land owners, making an agreement that none of the 1
lots should be used for tl, purpose of selling lieuor. They
agreed to embody this in all subsequent conveyances, and the
equity court held that this was binding upon all who took
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with notice. It seems then to be a general rule that where
llnds are dibided into lot.v ,and there are pla:,od in subse-
quent conveyances clauses that can be shown to be intended to
be beneficial to the other lots this will be regarded in
equity as ah easement. Tobey v. Loore_,I >ass., 448;
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins., Co., 87 N.Y., 400;
Trtstees v. Lynch., 70 N.Y., 440.
The courts go even farther in the case of Gilbert v.
Petler, 38 Barb., 488. In this case one Gilbert owned a
certain piece of property, and wished to keep the view fiom
the said property unobstructed. To do this it was necessary
to prevent the building onaljoining lot. He bought the
estate in question and had t;.c deed made out in the name of
a third party without declaring any trust in his own favor.
The third party at Gilbert's request then sold the estate to
F. and covenantcd with Gilbert, his heirs and assigns that
they should not erect any building to obstruct the view from
Gilbert's house. There were several successive conveyances
of this parcel in which this covenant or restriction was
noticed, and Gilbert made a qualified release to one of the
-21-
owmersof the restriction as to the part of the premises.
The Court held, that there was a negative ex ement upon
this estate and ehforceable in equity. " The actions of
courts of equity in such cases is not limited by rules of
legal liability and does not depend upon legal privity of
estate, or reuire that the patty invoking the aid of the
court should come in under and after the covenant. A cov-
enant or agreement restricting the use of any lands or tene-
ments in favor of or on account of other lands , creates an
easement, and makes one tenement in the language of the civil
law, servient, and the other -t ir:d .... i. without re-
gard to any privity or connection of title or estate in the
two parcels or their owners. All that is necessary is a
clear manifestation of the intention of the -erson who is
the source of title to subject one parcel of land to a re-
striction in its use for the benefit of another, whether that
other belongs at the time to himself or to third persons, and
sufficient lan:_uage to make that restriction perpetual."
Badger v, Boardnan, 16 Gray., 42; Parker v. Nightengale, 6
Allen, 348.
-22-
The English courts holds substantially the ..ame doctrinc
as the American , and it will bc unneceszary to more than cite
a few of the more important cases.
Rankin v. Huskisson, 4 Simp. Ch., 13; iann v. Simpson,
15 Sinp., 377; Piggott v. Stratton, 1 DeG.F.&.J., 53, Tulk
v. oxhay, 1 H.& F., 135.
The general rule in ro-ard to passing the incidents of
an equitable easement , is th, the intentions so to do must
be shown.
The discussion of the above cases serve to show the
growing importance of equitable casements in the United Ststes
As population increaces the cases in which equitable rermdies
:i be necessary are multiplying. It is now left to con-
sider how equitable remedies may be cnforcoc.
I
When Will Equity Interfere ?
The proposition may be laid down unless it be to prevent
irremediable mischief equity will not interfere when the
title is in question. This must be first settled by a court,
of law. An instance of irremOclal mischief which may be
prevented by an application to a court of equity is the erect-
ion of a bui ding so near to the house of another as to darY-
en the windows against the right of the owner. It was laid
down by Lord Romilly in Heff v. Bucknell L.RJ., 8 Eq., 6, tha
where a man possesses a right to light and air over the prop-
erty of his neighbor, the obstruction of which will be punish-
able at law, in the shape of damages, a court of equity will
by injunction prevent that obstruction if the injury which
would ensue would be of a )ermancnt character.
So in a case wh(.re the plaintiffs are cntitlod to the
purity -jf wJater and the defehdants pollute it, the plaintiff
may1° go into equity and get _n injunction restraining him from
so polluting the water.
In the case of Patterson v. Gifford, L.R. 18 Eq., 262,
it was hold that in order to obtain an injunction to prevent
a violation of a right, it must be shown that uch violation
would be the Inevitable result of the act sought to be pre-
vented, riot that it might be .
In America the general rule prevails that injunctions
will not be granted unless the right at law has been clearly
-24-
established.
In the class z of cases of which D'arker v. Hightengale
is an a_7ample, there being no privity between the dominant
and servient tenement equity will very readily interfere even
though there be no action at law. .o where a suit at law
will though successful furnish inadequate remedy equity is
alwaysready to step in.
Vhen a court of equity does take jurisdictioi. of a ase
it may take complete jurisdiction and enjoin against future
infringements and award damages for the past.
It would be interesting to follow the workins of equity
in the many and diverse branches of easements, but enough
has boon said t-o show when and how equity will prevent the
distrurbance of peaceful enjoyment and so the object of this
paper, I hope, has in a slight measure been a complished.
May, 19, 1804.
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